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Abstract
Since 2005, reported laser attacks from people on the ground directed towards arriving and departing aircraft have increased over
300%. A laser aimed at the windshield of an aircraft startles a pilot and may cause injury. This study determined empirical evidence of
laser intensity in the flight deck and the potential for harm to the human eye at various distances. Results of this study revealed that
relatively low-powered lasers had measured intensity levels through cockpit windshields at the 200 and 500 feet distances that may cause
damage to crewmembers’ eyes according to standards established by the federal government. At longer distances of 1000, 1500, and 2000
feet, these same lasers did not reveal measured intensities at levels to cause damage to crewmembers’ eyes; however, they were
considered as having potentially distracting visual effects in flight that were further categorized as temporary flash blindness, glare or
disruption, and distraction or startle.
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Introduction
The safety record of aviation has never been better and
continues to improve. The number of fatal airline accidents
in 2011 is the lowest in the last decade (Ranter, 2011).
While these safety achievements have contributed to a
positive public opinion of aviation, there is always room for
improvement.
Generally, aviation accidents have three basic causes:
severe weather, mechanical malfunction, or human error
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2010). Technological improve-
ments in the manufacture of aircraft and safety devices
introduced during the past two decades have reduced
accidents such as controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), mid-
air collisions, and wind shear (Hawkins, 1998). Industry
experts increasingly believe that the biggest accident risks
now tend to come from surface threats. Richard Healing, a
former member of the National Transportation Safety Board,
agrees that ‘‘runway events are much more likely to pose a
major hazard than in-flight problems’’ (Pasztor, 2011, p. A3).
Another aviation hazard that has steadily become more
common over the past several years is laser attacks on
aircraft. For this study, the definition of a laser attack is
both the intentional and unintentional use of a laser beam
striking an aircraft windshield during any phase of flight or
ground operation. Since the FAA began formally tracking
laser event reports in 2005, the number of reports has
increased from 300 to over 3,000 over a six year period
(Sabota, 2011). Several factors are responsible for the
reported increase including greater awareness, outreach to
pilots to encourage reporting, the availability of inexpen-
sive laser devices on the internet, stronger power levels that
enable lasers to hit aircraft at higher altitudes, and the
introduction of green lasers—which emit the most sensitive
wavelength for the human eye (Sabota, 2011).
The highest risk with intentional laser targeting from the
ground would be during visual conditions at night on a
predictable flight path, such as an instrument approach to a
busy airport (Steenblik, 2011). These conditions and phases
of flight can be especially dangerous due to the low altitude
of the aircraft, the higher workload of the pilot, and the ease
with which an assailant can aim a laser. According to
Randy Babbitt, former Administrator of the FAA, when a
high-powered laser shines into the flight deck of an airplane
or helicopter, it can temporarily blind a pilot and make it
difficult to safely fly or land the aircraft (Leiser, 2011).
Scott Wallace from Careflight explained that repercussions
from laser attacks may involve pilots with damaged
eyesight deemed permanently unsafe to fly for hire
(Sabota, 2011).
To initially combat this criminal trend, the FAA recently
launched a website to provide information on the dangers
of laser incidents and to make it easier for pilots and
witnesses to file reports (Leiser, 2011). In June 2011, the
FAA began imposing fines of up to $11,000 against people
caught shining lasers at planes (Hawley, 2011). ‘‘No
accidents have been attributed to the illumination of
crewmembers by lasers, but given the sizeable number of
reports and debilitating effects that can accompany such
events, the potential does exist’’ (Nakagawara, Wood, &
Montgomery, 2010, p. 1). Other strategies to reduce laser
attacks include educating the public regarding the risks of
lasers to aviation safety, encouraging the reporting of
malicious behavior, restricting the sale of certain laser
devices to the general public, requiring manufacturers to
attach warning labels on laser devices, using laser eye
protection in the aviation environment, and deploying laser
detection and recording systems on aircraft (Sabota, 2011).
Advancements in laser technology and the danger they
pose have created the need for laser eye protection. Some
measures have been implemented into the flight deck of
aircraft. Laser eye protection in the form of filters that are
placed in spectacles and visors alter the environment in
which pilots must work and can cause problems (Svec,
2005). ‘‘One case involved aircrew wearing yellow visors
attempting to land on an unusable portion of the runway,
they were unable to see the large yellow ‘X’ indicating the
hazard’’ (Svec, 2005, p. 42). One possible mitigation
method is for the pilot to wear a pair of protective eyewear
that reflect specific laser wavelengths (Stewart, 2005). For
a variety of reasons, many people don’t want to wear
glasses or visors. Some of these devices do not allow
enough light to pass through to the eye, which is especially
important during night flight, and some change color
perception. In addition, they need special care and must be
safely stored to prevent damage (Svec, 2005).
There may be several possible reasons why people direct
lasers at aircraft. In some cases, perpetrators are trying to
inflict harm; in other cases the acts are unintentional and
individuals are unaware of the potential danger. In one case,
a man who was arrested near St. Louis, Missouri, admitted
that he was unaware that the laser beam illuminated the
whole flight deck (Lengel, 2011). Patrick Murphy, executive
director of the International Laser Display Association,
believes that average citizens point lasers at aircraft for the
following reasons (Steenblik, 2011):
1. The beam doesn’t appear to reach the aircraft.
2. Users think the beam will hit the bottom of the
aircraft.
3. They think only a small laser ‘‘spot’’ will strike the
aircraft.
Malicious or unintended discharging of a laser or other
device into the flight deck of any aircraft is a safety hazard
regardless what the reason for such discharge may be.
Statement of the Problem
Since 2005, the number of laser events has increased by
over 300% (Nakagawara et al., 2010). Given the sizeable
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number of reports and potentially harmful effects that can
accompany such events, this situation may lead to an
increase in aircraft accidents. This review of literature was
unable to uncover any published studies that have provided
empirical evidence of the harmful effects of laser illumina-
tion to pilots through aircraft windshields. Therefore,
researchers in this study measured the harmful effects of
lasers similar to those directed at pilots flying aircraft in an
effort to answer the following research questions:
1. What is the measured intensity of laser light
penetrating the flight deck based on laser wavelength,
laser power output, and range as the laser penetrates
various aircraft windshields?
2. Do measured intensities exceed federally mandated
eye safety tolerances established by the Center for
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH)?
Methodology
Windshields
The following aircraft windshields, which are represen-
tative of the most common flight operations to be targeted
in laser events, will be used in this study: a jet windshield
and a general aviation windshield. The jet windshield is
approximately 1.25 inches thick and is comprised of layers
of vinyl compound and glass. The general aviation
windshield was approximately 0.125 inch thick Plexiglas.
Lasers
Three relatively low-powered lasers were selected to
represent lasers readily available for public purchase.
Lasers utilized were a green 532 nm (nanometer) 50 mW
(milliwatt) diode pumped solid state laser, a red 633 nm
high powered pointer laser on a taser gun sight, and a violet
405 nm 100 mW diode laser. The green laser is categorized
as a very bright and diffraction limited (the beam diameter
remains relatively small even after traveling a long
distance) beam. This laser is considered the worst case
scenario for a pilot. The red laser is not diffraction limited
but is readily available for consumer purchase.
Measures
A Newport Optical Power Meter, high-performance
model 1918R was used to measure the laser light intensity
in milliwatts. A hand-held, post mounted detector model
918SL-OD3 was connected to the meter.
Procedures
Readings were collected at the former Frankfort Illinois
Airport (LL40) which is closed to the public and privately
owned. The airport had a 4203 6 50 foot level runway
with an elevation of 778 feet. Lasers were set up at the west
end of the runway on a portable industry-grade optical table
aimed east. Testing began after sunset to reduce signal-to-
noise ratio issues caused by the sun. Distances of 200, 500,
1000, 1500 and 2000 feet were marked on the runway
using a digital measuring wheel. A 4 6 4 foot peg board
screen was located at each marked distance and used to
standardize data collection. Using the pegboard provided
evenly spaced holes (1 6 1 inch) to effectively measure
beam area and more accurately place the Newport Optical
Power Meter.
The trial procedure was as follows: the laser was aimed
down the runway towards the pegboard screen through
each windshield. Laser beam spot power was measured by
positioning the hand-held detector flush and centered over
several screen holes, creating a power intensity map. This
procedure was repeated for each of the three lasers while
measuring beam size and power at all ranges (see Table 1).
Results
The first research question was constructed to determine
the measured intensity of laser light penetrating the flight
deck based on laser wavelength and range as the laser hits
various aircraft windshields. For each colored laser,
outdoor measurements were taken at night using 2009,
5009, 10009, 15009, and 20009 distances. Each laser’s
measurements were then analyzed as described in the
procedures section. Tables 2 through 4 report the measured
maximum power per unit area (mW/cm2) of light through
general aviation and jet windshield from each laser at
specific ranges.
Although measurements through the jet windshield
differed, the trends remained consistent with the general
aviation results. As distance increased, measured power of
the laser on the screen decreased (refer to Figure 1). A
visual depiction of the CDRH Class Map for this
measurement can be found in Figures 2 through 5.
An additional characteristic to consider is not only the
brightness of the laser light but also the size of the beam at
Table 1
Laser measurement procedures
Distances (ft.) 200 500 1000 1500 2000
Laser Red/Green/Violet Red/Green/Violet Red/Green/Violet Red/Green/Violet Red/Green/Violet
Windshields None/GA/Jet None/GA/Jet None/GA/Jet None/GA/Jet None/GA/Jet
R. J. DeMik et al. / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 11
the various distances. The beam size increased for all lasers
as the distance increased (refer to Figure 5). The examina-
tion of the data reveals that at 1000 feet the violet and green
lasers maintain more maximum power per unit area and
their beams are noticeably larger than the red laser. It
should be noted that this is largely a result of the lower
power level of the red laser used in this study1.
The second research question was constructed to
determine whether the measured intensities exceed CDRH
eye safety requirements through each flight deck wind-
shield. Table 5 outlines CDRH laser classifications. The
examination of the data reveals eye damage would be
possible at the 200 foot range for all three lasers and at the
500 foot range for the green and violet lasers tested in this
study. It should be noted that a more powerful red laser
with the power classification of the green and violet used in
this study may also cause eye damage at the 500 foot range.
At 1000 feet and greater there is no threat of permanent eye
damage for the lasers tested in this study; however, there
are still physiological effects associated with exposure to
intense light. These effects, as defined by Murphy (2009),
are distraction and startle, glare and disruption, and
temporary flash blindness.
Murphy (2009) categorizes the first classification as
distraction and startle (less than 0.5 uW/cm2) which is
defined as ‘‘an unexpected laser or bright light that can
distract the pilot during a nighttime landing or takeoff. He
or she might not immediately realize what was happening.
Also, the pilot may be worried that a brighter light or other
threat would be coming’’ (p. 3). The second classification is
glare and disruption (0.5 uW/cm2 to 5.0 uW/cm2). This
category makes it difficult for the pilot to see the
environment outside and night vision begins to dissipate.
The final classification is temporary flash blindness
(5.0 uW/cm2 to 50 uW/cm2) which is similar to a camera
flash. The CDRH numbers were determined from the
CDRH regulations assuming a 7 mm diameter aperture and
a 0.25 second blink response time (human’s natural blink
reflex).
Table 2
Green laser intensity and physiological effects
Green Laser






CDRH Class FAA Visual Effects
200 3 3.57 2.94 IIIA Possible Eye Damage
500 5 0.75 0.62 I Possible Eye Damage
1000 14 0.14 0.11 I Possible Eye Damage
1500 18 0.062 0.051 I Possible Eye Damage
2000 36 0.023 0.019 I Temporary Flash Blindness
Table 3
Violet laser intensity and physiological effects
Violet Laser






CDRH Class FAA Visual Effects
200 2 6 4 4.77 3.94 IIIA Possible Eye Damage
500 4 6 7 0.77 0.64 I Possible Eye Damage
1000 5 6 36 0.21 0.17 I Possible Eye Damage
1500 6 6 54 0.060 0.050 I Possible Eye Damage
2000 Exceeds Target Dimensions 0.015 0.012 I Temporary Flash Blindness
1 A red laser of high intensity (50 mW) was not made available in time for
this study.
Table 4
Red laser intensity and physiological effects
Red Laser






CDRH Class FAA Visual Effects
200 1 6 2 0.45 0.38 I Possible Eye Damage
500 3 6 4 0.069 0.057 I Possible Eye Damage
1000 4 6 5 0.021 0.018 I Temporary Flash Blindness
1500 8 6 10 0.0094 0.0078 I Temporary Flash Blindness
2000 11 6 16 0.0049 0.0040 I Glare/Disruption
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Discussion of the Results
The purpose of this laser study was to provide empirical
evidence that laser light penetrating the flight deck of an
aircraft could cause retinal damage or create other safety
hazards for pilots and the flying public. The specific intent
of the study was to determine the laser light power and
beam size at different critical distances from an aircraft.
The results of this study indicated that the selected low
power lasers measured at distances from 2009 to 20009
would likely not cause permanent retinal damage. Data also
illustrated that the laser light beams spread to a large
Figure 1. Measurement of power output for all lasers over distance.
Figure 2. Classification map for the green laser.
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enough size which would illuminate the flight deck of an
aircraft with enough power to cause a pilot to be distracted.
Distraction in this study is defined as temporary impair-
ment of the pilot and further categorized as temporary flash
blindness, glare/disruption or distraction/startle.
Potential eye damage readings occurred at closer
distances of 2009 and 5009. Green lasers are the focus of
concern as 91% of laser strikes are with lasers of this color
(Nakagawara et al., 2010). As darkness increases, the rods
in the human eye become more active making the human
eye more sensitive to green light even if the lasers are at
similar output powers (Robinson & Schmidt, 1984). As a
result, the green laser beams appear to be brighter than
other colors (Environmental Health & Safety, 2012).
Regardless of the bright appearance of laser light, such
as were used in this research, it is unlikely that permanent
damage to a pilot’s eyes could occur in a laser illumination
event. This is partly due to a human’s natural blink reflex
which serves as sufficient retinal protection (Barkana &
Belkin, 2000). Studies show that after a laser eye injury,
Figure 3. Classification map for the violet laser. Note: Only 200 feet readings are given. At 2,000 feet the beam size exceeded the measuring target.
Figure 4. Classification map for the red laser.
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vision usually returns to normal within months (Baumal,
2011). Furthermore, Baumal (2011) posits that ‘‘it appears
to be difficult to produce ocular injury with a laser pointer
without deliberate inappropriate, prolonged, foveal expo-
sure’’ (p. 1023).
Based on the results of this study, the potential risk to
flight safety during illumination events is not necessarily
eye damage; rather, it is the possibility of flight crews being
distracted during critical phases of flight below 20009. In a
2004 report by Nakagawara and Montgomery, the most
common adverse visual effects reported by pilot test
subjects immediately after each exposure to laser light
were glare (30.9%) and flash blindness (30.9%), followed
by after images (13.0%). In approximately 75% of all
responses, test subjects indicated they experienced adverse
visual effects when exposed to any of the three levels of
laser irradiance.
Since laser illumination events are on the rise, researchers
from this study recommend organizations conducting flight
operations produce flight crew procedures to mitigate visual
effects (temporary flash blindness, glare/disruption, distrac-
tion/startle) of laser illuminations exposure. According to
Nakagawara et al. (2010), the following recommendations
could serve as a guideline to develop specific procedures:
have the non-flying pilot be prepared to take control of the
aircraft; consider engaging autopilot to maintain flight path
(if applicable); climb or turn away in order to use the
fuselage of the aircraft to block the laser; inform air traffic
control of last known location and direction of the beam; and
increase the intensity of cockpit lighting.
In order to minimize damage to the eyes, Nakagawara
et al. (2010) also suggest pilots should shield and avoid
rubbing their eyes to prevent further injuries. For any visual
symptoms that persist after landing, the pilot should be
examined by a qualified physician.
Recommendations for Future Research
The effects of flight deck laser illumination demand
further research. While regulations and laws have been
implemented, laser illumination events continue to rise and
the threat to flight crews is significant. Possible solutions
include: improved laser eye protection such as glasses
or goggles, protective coatings on windshields, sensory
equipment to alert pilots, and continuing public education
on the hazards of laser illumination as well as FAA efforts
to increase penalties.
Another area for future research is the inclusion and
comparison of higher powered lasers of multiple varieties
(color, strength, etc.). Lasers of higher intensities have the
potential to inflict greater optical damage at the ranges
utilized in this study. While the researchers of this study
used handheld lasers readily available to the public, future
research should include lasers designed for commercial and
industrial use.
Figure 5. Measurement of beam size for all lasers over distance.
Table 5
Threshold classifications for CDRH and Murphy
Classification Thresholds*
Classification Min. Power/Unit Area (mW/cm2)
CDRH Class IIIB 13.0
CDRH Class IIIA 2.6
CDRH Class I no minimum
Possible Eye Damage 0.05
Temporary Flash Blindness 0.005
Glare/Disruption 5.0 6 1025
Distraction/Startle no minimum
*Note: Derived from CDRH regulations.
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